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CHAPTER 7 
Commercial Law 
WILLIAM E. HOGAN 
§7.1. The Uniform Commercial Code. On October 1, 1958, the 
Uniform Commercial Code became the law of the Commonwealth.1 
Elsewhere the Code was enacted in Kentucky to become effective on 
July 1, 1960.2 Locally the Special Commission studying the Code, be-
tween the time of its enactment and its effective date, found the statute 
to be a desirable improvement in the law, "with no hidden pitfalls or 
substantial mistakes in drafting," and accordingly recommended that 
its effective date should not be deferred.3 Certain amendments to the 
Code were proposed by the Commission, and the General Court sub-
stantially concurred by enacting Chapter 542 of the Acts of 1958. For 
the most part the amending act is concerned with the elimination of 
clerical errors and with the record-keeping mechanics related to the 
filing system for secured transactions. Of these only the revision of the 
suggested form for notice-filing is of general interest.' The new form 
provides for the insertion of a maturity date, the entry by the filing 
officer of the file numbers and the time of filing, and for a check system 
of indicating a claim to proceeds and the presence of collateral related 
to realty. Ii 
Of more substantive significance is the amendment of Code Subsec-
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§7.1. 1 Acts of 1957. c. 765. §21. Careful note should be made of §19 of that act 
which permits the termination and enforcement of transactions entered into prior 
to the first of October in accordance with the prior law. 
2 Ky. Laws of 1958. S.B. No. 169. effective July I. 1960. Fourteen other states 
will be asked to consider the Code in 1959. They are Colorado. Connecticut. 
Georgia. Illinois. Indiana. Maine. Michigan. Nevada. New Hampshire. New Mexico. 
North Dakota. Ohio. Utah and Vermont. Schnader. New Movement Toward Uni-
formity in Commercial Law. 13 Business L. 646. 672 (1958). For an excellent dis-
cussion of the development of the Code. see Braucher. The Legislative History of 
the Uniform Commercial Code. 58 Colum. L. Rev. 798 (1958). 
a House No. 3175. p. 5 (1958). The Commission was extended to December 
30.1958. Resolves of 1958. c. 46. 
4 G.L .• c. 106. §9·402. 
Ii Acts of 1958. c. 542. §14. 
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tions 9-312(3) and (5).6 In the terminology of the law prior to the 
Code, former Subsection 9-312(3) dealt typically with the means by 
which a conditional seller of inventory may obtain priority over a prior 
chattel mortgagee claiming under an after-acquired property clause. 
Under the Code the seller is required to perfect his security interest 
and to notify the mortgagee of the seller's interest prior to the time 
when the buyer obtains possession of the new inventory. The amend-
ment clarifies the definition of the group entitled to notification by re-
quiring the conditional seller to notify those who had filed a financing 
statement covering the same kind of inventory prior to the filing by the 
seller. The amendment of Subsection 9-312(5) makes it clear that, if 
the conditional seller is not entitled to priority under the special pro-
visions of Subsections 9-312(2) and (4), priority may still be obtained 
on the basis of the "first-to-file" rule set forth in Subsection 9-312(5).7 
The other substantial amendment concerns the sales article war-
ranty against patent infringement claims.s A new provision eliminates 
that warranty as to any claims for which the exclusive remedy of the 
claimant is by action against the United States in the federal courts. 
This amendment is designed to leave unaffected by the Code the legal 
relationship of parties contracting to supply goods to the federal gov-
ernment when the contract terms and federal statutes spell out the spe-
cial obligations and remedies. 
§7.2. Retail instalment sales. Significant legal problems are per-
haps the inevitable attendants of extraordinary expansion in any single 
commercial activity. Instalment selling at the retail level has grown at 
a startling rate since the beginning of World War II. Federal Reserve 
Board studies reveal that automobile and other consumer goods paper 
grew nearly seven times from 1939 to 1955.1 
Locally the appellate cases have mirrored this growth mainly in a 
single area, namely, interpreting the provisions of G.L., c. 255, §13A, 
which requires as a mandatory contract term the provision that a con-
ditional buyer must be credited with the proceeds of any sale upon 
default "after deducting the reasonable expenses of repossession and 
resale." Apparently the stringently literal application of Section 13A, 
penalizing violations with the loss of the security interest, was being 
gradually eased.2 This trend continued in Lepore v. Atlantic Cor-
poration,3 in which the conditional sales agreement called for a flat 15 
percent attorney's fee. The contract also contained the required statu-
6Id. §§12, 13. 
7 See Bankers' Manual on the Uniform Commercial Code, p. 121, n .•• (1958). 
8 G.L., c. 106, §2-312(3). 
§7.2. 1 Federal Reserve Board, Consumer Instalment Credit, Part I, p. 148 (1957). 
2 Compare National Cash Register Co. v. Warner, 335 Mass. 736, 142 N.E.2d 584 
(1957), with Clark v. A & J Transportation Co., 330 Mass. 327, 113 N.E.2d 228 
(1953). 
31958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 335, 147 N.E.2d 817. The case also held that the disclosure 
provisions of G.L., c. 255, §12 were not violated when the contract failed to state 
affirmatively that there was no trade· in and no down payment. 
2
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tory language with the preface, "Anything herein contained to the 
contrary notwithstanding," together with a general clause attempting 
to conform the contract to any applicable regulatory laws. It was held 
that the financing agency had not lost its security interest because the 
contract was read as a whole to exclude any deduction forbidden by the 
statute. Although the decision may at first appear to be of only aca-
demic interest because Section 13A is repealed by the local enactment 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, it adopts a theory that dangerously 
impairs other instalment sales regulatory legislation, both present and 
future. 4 The regulatory acts detailing contract terms are aimed at in-
forming the consumer and protecting him against the overreaching 
made possible by the disparate bargaining position and skill of the 
seller or financing agency.5 When default occurs, the creditor will first 
seek payment without resorting to litigation, and the forbidden clause 
then becomes either a tool to coerce payment or a means of increasing 
the amount to be paid. Savings clauses or language tucked away in 
another part of the form will hardly be brought to the attention of the 
debtor. Thus, although the Lepore case may be justifiable on its facts 
as it involved a sale to a businessman rather than a consumer, its 
theory nonetheless offers a weapon to the small unscrupulous segment 
of the consumer lending industry. 
Another major problem resulting from the growth of consumer in-
stalment selling stems from the tripartite nature of the transaction and 
the natural desire of the lender to reduce his risks. Commonly the 
seller and buyer make their arrangement, and the seller transfers his 
rights to a financing agency in the form of a note and either a chattel 
mortgage or conditional sale. If the buyer claims a defense against the 
seller, he sometimes finds an imposing array of legal notions barring 
the assertion of that defense against the financing agency. 
First, the traditional protection afforded a holder in due course of a 
negotiable instrument frees such a holder from the maker's personal 
defenses such as breach of warranty, fraud in the inducement, and 
failure of consideration. Elsewhere there is a significant body of rela-
tively recent case law denying holder-in-due-course status to a finan-
cing agency in these circumstances on the basis of the dealer-financer 
relationship, even in the absence of actual notice. 6 In Massachusetts 
4 After the close of the 1957 SURVEY year, the legislature enacted Chapter 674 of 
the Acts of 1958, effective January 19, 1959. The new statute establishes regulatory 
controls over secured instalment sales of motor vehicles used primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes. Sales finance companies dealing with such contracts 
must be licensed under rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Commis-
sioner of Banks. Furthermore, there are specific provisions governing the making 
and terms of the contract, prepayment, refinancing and the amount of the finance 
charge. This statute will be discussed in detail in the 1959 ANNUAL SURVEY. 
Ii Donaldson, An Analysis of Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 19 Rocky Mt. 
L. Rev. 135, 136 (1947). Generally, see Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment 
Sales Legislation, 44 Cornell L.Q. 38 (1958). 
6 See, e.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940); 
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 
P.2d 819 (1950); Associates Discount v. Goetzinger, 245 Iowa 326, 62 N.W.2d 191 
3
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the financing agencies prevailed in such cases in two decisions which 
failed to consider explicitly the financing agency's relationship to the 
seller.7 
Second, when a note is not employed, the financing agency may still 
assert a contractual provision whereby the buyer agrees not to assert 
such defenses against the assignee. This is the problem presented by 
Quality Finance Co. v. Hurley,8 in which a finance company, assignee 
of a conditional sales contract, sought and failed to avoid as a matter of 
law the buyer's assertion of lack of delivery based on such a clause. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, faced with a novel case, reached for sev-
eral reasons in declaring such a broad clause to be ineffective. One, it 
used the very strong public policy of protecting conditional vendees 
against the imposition by conditional vendors and instalment houses, 
which has heretofore mainly been expressed in interpreting the statu-
tory restrictions on retail instalment sales.9 Further, it held that the 
waiver clause is an attempt to give the attributes of negotiability to a 
non-negotiable agreement and is therefore much more dangerous from 
the viewpoint of developing rules of law that can dynamically absorb 
developing new and honest business practices.tO The Uniform Com-
mercial Code appears to reject this argument, except in the case of 
consumer transactions, when it validates contractual waivers of de-
fenses.ll The third basis of the Court's position is founded upon G.L., 
c. 231, §5, which permits suits in the name of the assignee but also ex-
plicitly preserves the obligor's defenses against an assignee. The Court 
noted the weakness of a position based on this point when it acknowl-
edged that the statute is mainly procedural and was designed to insure 
that the assignee's direct suit does not deprive the obligor unwillingly 
of defenses he may have against the original obligee. All things con-
sidered, a policy of consumer protection seems to be the real root of 
this decision, and the case may portend a future erosion of the earlier 
cases insulating the financing agency as a holder in due course. How-
ever, it should also be noted that the case did leave open to the finance 
company the power to make out factually a claim of estoppel by 
affirmative conduct which in part could be based upon the contractual 
waiver of defenses. 
(1954). See also Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer 
Paper, 1958 Wash. U.L.Q. 177. 
7 Standard Acceptance Corp. v. Chapin, 277 Mass. 278, 178 N.E. 538 (1931); Com· 
mercial Credit Co. v. McDonough, 238 Mass. 73, 130 N.E. 179 (1921). 
81958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 397, 148 N.E.2d 385. 
9 Mogul v. Boston Acceptance Co., Inc., 328 Mass. 424, 104 N.E.2d 427 (1952). 
10 Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty, 59 Yale L.J. 1209 (1950). 
11 G.L., c. 106, §9·206. Under the Code the issue in consumer goods transactions 
is referred entirely to local law. If the Quality Finance case "establishes a special 
rule for consumer goods transactions as to contractual waiver of defenses," it does 
not necessarily follow that Massachusetts law makes a similar provision for cases 
involving negotiable instruments. Article 3 of the Code appears to reject the all or 
nothing approach indicated in the opinion since the formal requirements for nego· 
tiability are made determinative of the paper's inclusion within the negotiable 
instrument provisions. 
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To many the most startling rule of law embodied in the Uniform 
Commercial Code protects the ownership claims of a buyer in the 
ordinary course of business from a merchant seller who was entrusted 
with possession by the true owner.12 Using the tools of Connecticut 
law, the Massachusetts Court recently reached a result consistent with 
this provision of the Code. In Budget Plan, Inc. v. Savoy,13 the facts 
involved successive, recorded conditional sales of the same motor 
vehicle by an automobile dealer. Upon default by the first buyer the 
finance company, assignee of the first contract, caused the car to be re-
possessed and placed the original dealer in possession of the car. Sub-
sequently, the dealer sold and delivered the car to a second buyer and 
assigned the second conditional sales contract to a different finance 
company. When the first finance company claimed title and took 
possession of the car, the second buyer (joined by the second finance 
company) brought an action of tort for conversion. First, the Court 
determined that there was sufficient basis for the conclusion that the 
first finance company permitted the dealer to remain in possession with 
the expectation that the past practices of the parties, which included 
listing repossessed cars for resale, would be followed. This was ap-
parently enough to preclude the first finance company from denying 
the dealer's authority to sell. Second, the Court concluded that the 
constructive notice from the recording of the first conditional sale did 
not extend to affect the rights of the second buyer and the second 
finance company. This result is also consistent with the Code. Under 
Section 1-201(9) a "buyer in the ordinary course of business" is defined 
as one who buys in good faith and without knowledge that the sale 
violates the ownership rights of another. Knowledge is elsewhere 
defined in terms of actual not constructive knowledge.14 
Some of the most troublesome legal problems arising from retail in-
stalment sales transactions relate to the secured party's right to recover 
from a third party who negligently injures the goods. Basically the 
issues are threefold. Does the secured creditor have a sufficient interest 
in the goods to bring suit against the negligent third party? Will the 
recovery be limited to the amount of the debt? What is the effect of 
the debtor's contributory negligence upon the secured party's right of 
recovery against the negligent third party? 
In Bell Finance Co. v. Gefter15 it was held that the assignee of a 
conditional seller of an automobile could recover full damages from a 
negligent third party for injuring the goods prior to default while the 
car was in the possession of the non-negligent buyer.16 The Supreme 
12 G.L., c. 106, §2-403(2) and (3). See 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §3.6. 
13336 Mass. 322, 145 N.E.2d 710 (1957). 
14 G.L., c. 106, §1-201(25). 
151958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 305, 147 N.E.2d 815 (1958). 
16 In Morris Plan Co. v. Hillcrest Farms Dairy, Inc., 323 Mass. 452, 82 N.E.2d 
889 (1948), the conditional seller was permitted to recover from a negligent third 
party when the buyer was in default and guilty of contributory negligence at the 
time of the accident and when it did not appear that the damage was greater or 
less than the debt. 
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Judicial Court indicated that to the extent that the finance company's 
recovery exceeded the amount of the debt the surplus would be held 
for the benefit of the buyer. Thus full recognition is given to the 
bargained for position of the conditional vendor by permitting him a 
property interest in the goods prior to any default by the buyer. A 
contrary result, limiting recovery to cases in which the buyer is in de-
fault at the time of the accident, would not only deprive the seller of 
the benefits of his bargain but would also call for testing the seller's 
standing prior to the time of greatest risk to the seller. It seems obvi-
ous that a buyer is more likely to lose interest and default after injury 
to or destruction of the goods. Furthermore, this kind of approach 
can lead to rather meaningless distinctions between cases in which the 
buyer merely failed to make payments and those in which the seller has 
"put the buyer in default." 17 
Determining the amount of the secured party's recovery is a more 
complex question. One might argue that so long as the damaged 
goods are sufficiently valuable to permit realization of the amount of 
the debt, the secured party has sustained no loss; but this conclusion is 
based upon an oversimplification. Injury to the collateral should not 
automatically accelerate the non-negligent debtor's obligation even 
when acceleration might be effected at the creditor's option. There is 
no apparent reason for precluding the creditor from permitting the 
debtor to continue to repay the debt according to the original terms. 
Under some agreements the debtor may have a right to continue the 
credit extension. In such circumstances damaged collateral equal in 
value to the amount of the debt at the time of the injury will probably 
decrease in value more rapidly during the remaining period of the 
credit extension. The creditor's assumption of a risk that the col-
lateral would decline in value should not be enlarged to include that 
peril when the collateral has been harmed solely by the negligence of 
a third party.18 
On the other hand, the secured party is fully protected if the reo 
covery is limited to the amount of the debt outstanding. The property 
interest exists primarily as a source for satisfying the debt in the event 
of a default, so that recovery against the negligent third party should 
be limited to that amount.19 However, faced with considerable prec-
17 Lacey v. Great Northern Railway Co., 70 Mont. 346, 255 Pac. 808 (1924). See 
also Gas City Transfer Co., Inc. v. Miller, 107 Ind. App. 210, 21 N.E.2d 428 (1939). 
Compare First National Acceptance Corp. v. Annett, 121 N.J.L. 356, 2 A.2d 650 
(1938). The confusion attendant upon a rule depending upon default is greater 
when one considers the problem of the mortgagee's estoppel. See Francis v. Mogul, 
1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 871, 150 N.E.2d 924. 
18 For an apparently contrary argument, see Note, 40 Yale L.J. 135, 136 (1930). 
19 If a court had power to enter a conditional judgment or stay execution de-
pendent upon the buyer's later default, the problem of measuring the damages 
would be eased. Similarly the question in the Racheotes case, discussed in text sup· 
ported by notes 22·26 infra, would be greatly simplified because a means would be 
available for shifting the risk of the buyer's default and solvency to the negligent 
third party. 
6
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edent involving other security devices,20 the Court in the Getter case 
permits full recovery by the conditional seller, indicating that the 
surplus over and above the amount of the debt is held for the condi-
tional buyer. In one aspect this rule limits the effective recovery to 
the amount of the debt and reduces the number of lawsuits required to 
adjust the position of the parties. 
It is noteworthy that the opinion carefully and explicitly avoids 
making decisive distinctions based upon the kind of legal form utilized 
by the parties. To this extent the case is consistent with the policy of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, which itself contains no provision 
directly dealing with this problem.21 A second case during the SURVEY 
year took this same attitude. In Harvard Trust Co. v. Racheotes,22 a 
collision insurer, as subrogee to the position of a chattel mortgagee, was 
the real plaintiff seeking to recover from a negligent third party for in-
jury to the mortgaged car resulting from the concurring negligence of 
the defendant and the mortgagor. 
This fact situation presents the very issue reserved in the Bell Fi-
nance Co. opinion: what is the effect of the negligence of the mortgagor 
upon the measure of the mortgagee's right to recover? Omitting for 
the moment the presence of the insurer, the resolution of the problem 
must take into consideration several of the relationships in this multi-
ple-party fact situation. First, the secured party's interest in the col-
lateral should be preserved, and the debtor's negligence cannot be im-
puted to the mortgagee.23 Secondly, the contributory negligence of the 
mortgagor should be a defense in favor of the negligent third party in 
any action brought by the contributorily negligent debtor. Thirdly, 
neither the third party nor the debtor, each negligent to the same 
degree and in the same manner, is entitled to any contribution from 
the other in the event one responds to the mortgagee for injuring the 
goods.24 Finally, to avoid a windfall to the mortgagee, the secured 
party should not be permitted to recover for the injury to the goods 
and still collect the full debt from the mortgagor. Because of the last 
consideration any recovery by the mortgagee must in a sense ultimately 
benefit the mortgagor. This upsets the allocation of the loss as be-
tween the mortgagor and the negligent thitd party imposed by the 
doctrine of contributory negligence. However, contributory negli-
gence is not based upon consideration of allocation of loss.25 It is 
20 See, e.g., Codman v. Freeman, 3 Cush. 306 (Mass. 1849) (mortgage); Pomeroy v. 
Smith, 17 Pick. 85 (Mass. 1835) (pledge). 
21 UCC §2·722 might be stretched to cover this case, although it is aimed mainly 
at the similar seller· buyer problem. 
221958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 309, 147 N.E.2d 817 (1958). Compare comments on this 
case in §3.2 supra. 
23 Morris Plan Co. v. Hillcrest Farms Dairy, Inc., 323 Mass. 452, 82 N.E.2d 889 
(1948) (conditional vendor); Nash v. Lang, 268 Mass. 407, 167 N.E. 762 (1929) 
(bailor). 
24 Restatement of Restitution §I02. 
25 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts §22.3, at 1207 (1956): "The foregoing, 
it is submitted, shows that there is no justification - in either policy or doctrine 
7
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particularly in the bailment and chattel security cases, rather clearly 
wholly a personal bar to suit by the contributorily negligent indi-
vidual. Thus in a case like Racheotes, although the recovery which 
the secured party is entitled to retain for itself inures indirectly to the 
contributorily negligent debtor, the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence should not be given a reverse twist to permit the third party an 
affirmative cause of action against the debtor. If by means of sub-
rogation to the mortgagee's creditor position or otherwise the third 
party is able to collect from the debtor the amount paid to the secured 
party, the debtor's contributory negligence will be the real basis for 
giving the negligent third party the derivative cause of action. Fur-
thermore, the negligent third party will obtain not merely contribution 
but full indemnification from his co-tortfeasor, the mortgagor. Such 
a result is not tenable without a substantial revision of the law based 
upon concurring fault. 
On the other hand, in measuring the amount of the mortgagee's re-
covery against the negligent third party, consideration can well be 
given to the mortgagor's concurring negligence. Recovery by the 
mortgagee over and above the amount of the mortgage indebtedness is 
at best questionable as indicated by the requirement in Getter that the 
secured party holds the surplus for the benefit of the debtor. No harm 
is really done to the mortgagee who recovers only the amount of the 
indebtedness and it is sensible to limit the mortgagee to that amount 
when any excess would be paid over to the concurrently negligent 
debtor. 
Is there any basis for altering the analysis when we allude to the fact 
that the real plaintiff in Racheotes is the collision insurer? Two policy 
considerations can be urged here. First, in allowing the collision in-
surer a right of subrogation to the mortgagee's position against the 
third party, the Racheotes case really shifts the responsibility from the 
plaintiff's collision insurer to the defendant's liability insurer_ This 
can be said to be undesirable since the collision insurer took on and 
was compensated for the risk of harm to the vehicle wholly or partially 
arising from the mortgagor's negligence while the liability insurer was 
not undertaking the risk of liability when its insured had a defense of 
contributory negligence. A short response to this analysis is that it 
ignores the secured party's distinct position as a plaintiff. More im-
portantly, however, the approach goes beyond the facts of the case and 
assumes the presence of enforceable property liability insurance. 
Great caution should be exercised in denying the collision insurer sub-
rogation rights to the mortgagee's position on such a basis without a 
clear indication that both kinds of insurance are present. Insurance 
undertakings should not rise to a status in which they determine the 
- for the rule of contributory negligence, except for the feeling that if one man 
is to be held liable because of his fault, then the fault of him who seeks to enforce 
that liability should also be considered." (Emphasis supplied.) See also Prosser, 
Law of Torts §51, at 283 (2d ed. 1955). 
8
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liabilities of parties who are strangers to the policy, at least in the 
absence of some strong expectation that coverage is present. 
Secondly, one can argue that the collision insurer should not be sub-
rogated to the mortgagee's position because upon payment of the in-
surance to the mortgagee, the debt between the mortgagee and mort-
gagor is discharged by the terms of the mortgage agreement. The 
consequence of such a discharge is that the mortgagee is made whole 
and loses his cause of action against the third party for negligent im-
pairment of the security. In Racheotes itself the parties to the litiga-
tion stipulated that the collision insurer was subrogated to the mort-
gagee's position. In the absence of such a stipulation the outcome 
should not be altered. Otherwise, the result will turn wholly upon 
whether the insurer and mortgagee time these actions prior to litiga-
tion so that the mortgagee has not been paid by the insurer. In that 
event the mortgagee will be able to proceed first against the negligent 
third party and then collect on the insurance. Certainly the mere 
presence of collision insurance should not preclude the mortgagee 
from recovering from the third party. That the mortgagee and in-
surer will so jointly plan their trial strategy is not an unrealistic con-
sideration when one appreciates the great number of cases where auto-
mobile financing and insurance are furnished by "tied-in" companies.26 
§7.3. Warranties of quality. Twice during the 1958 SURVEY year 
the Supreme Judicial Court divided over the effectiveness ·of the im-
plied warranty of merchantability in rather common fact situations. 
In Taylor v. Jacobson 1 the plaintiff purchased by trade name her regu-
lar brand of hair dye from the defendant, a retail druggist, and had the 
dye applied by a friend without complying with the accompanying 
manufacturer's directions, which called for a preliminary patch test 
to ascertain the user's sensitivity to the product. The plaintiff indi-
cated that she failed to follow the known directions because " ... she 
had used Roux so many times she didn't need a patch test ... " It 
was held that the lower court erred in denying the retailer's motion 
for a directed verdict. In reaching this result the Supreme Judicial 
Court first decided that the maker's cautionary directions were a part 
of the retail sale transaction. Despite the absence of any reference to 
those instructions at the time of the sale, the Court concluded that as 
a practical matter a retail druggist by necessary inference adopts any 
cautionary statements, disclaimers, and limitations made by the manu~ 
26 The extent of the phenomenon of the tied-in insurer can be seen in the sta-
tistical data that the contracts of the four major sales finance companies had in-
surance premiums for car insurance included in nearly 65 percent of their contracts 
in 1954 and 1955. Federal Reserve Board, Consumer Instalment Credit, Pt. IV, p. 76 
(1957). Further evidence of such an:angements appears in the financial structure 
of some of the finance companies: e.g., from 1950-1956, Motor Insurance Corp., 
owned by GMAC, had average yearly earnings of nearly $3 million. Moody, Bank 
and Financial Manual 841 (1957). Compare GMAC v. Commissioner of Banks, 258 
Wis. 56, 45 N.W.2d 83 (1950), rehearing denied, 258 Wis. 64a, 46 N.W.2d 328 (1951). 
§7.3. 1336 ~ass. 709, 147 N.E.2d 770 (1958). 
9
Hogan: Chapter 7: Commercial Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 2012
§7.3 COMMERCIAL LAW 81 
facturer on the package or in accompanying circulars of an item pur-
chased by trade name. The buyer admitted that she read the instruc-
tions after the sale, and this coupled with her prior long use of the 
product, led the Court to infer that the plaintiff had or should have 
had the instructions in mind when the sale was made. Although the 
record revealed that the plaintiff had read the instructions in the past 
and had in fact taken patch tests before for the product involved, the 
Court phrased its determination in terms of reason to know as well as 
actual knowledge of the limitations. The Court relied upon the sale 
by trade name and the plaintiff's prior use in distinguishing an earlier 
case calling for a more stringent test of adoption.2 Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code in these factual circumstances, it would seem that the 
retailer would adopt as part of the implied warranty of merchantability 
any claims of the manufacturer appearing on the label.s Dealing with 
the converse of the problem, the Taylor case reaches a consistent result 
as to language of disclaimer on the label. 
No real threat to the consumer results from the finding of an adop-
tion even on the basis of the buyer having reasonable cause to know of 
the limitation, so long as the safeguard set by the Court is maintained. 
That safeguard requires the limiting language to be sufficiently clear. 
On this issue the Court split, the majority concluding that the lan-
guage on the bottle and in the accompanying descriptive folder was 
adequate to warn the purchaser and to limit the retailer's liability. 
Mr. Justice Cutter, the author of the opinion, joined by Mr. Justice 
Counihan, concluded that the language was not sufficiently explicit to 
operate as a disclaimer. 
It has been suggested that the kind of difference of opinion revealed 
in the Taylor opinion will continue under the Code.4 Section 2-316 
permits written disclaimers of implied warranties only when the lan-
guage is "conspicuous," that is when a court determines that "a reason-
able person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it." 1\ 
Certainly, this test is not greatly different from the test of the Taylor 
case, even though one can distinguish the cases in which the buyer 
should have seen the instruction from those in which he should have 
understood the disclaimer. 
The Court divided again on the effect to be given to directions on a 
label in Vincent v. Tsiknas.6 The plaintiff was cut when a jar of baby 
food broke while she was removing the metal cover from the jar with 
an ordinary metal beer can opener. The cover contained the direction 
"Pry up gently at points indicated." In opening the jar, the plaintiff 
inserted the curved end of the opener into the space between the shoul-
der of the jar and the cover with the handle of the opener extended 
2 Sokoloski v. Splaun, 311 Mass. 203, 40 N.E.2d 874 (1942) (manufacturer's dis-
claimer on tag attached to seed bag not adopted by retailer). 
S G.L., c. 106, §2-314(1)(f). 
4 Braucher, Article 2.- Sales, Uniform Commercial Code of Massachusetts 97, 
115-116 (1958). 
1\ G.L., c. 106, §1-201(1O). 
61958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1039, 151 N.E.2d 263. 
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upward. The jar broke when the plaintiff applied downward pressure. 
A majority of the Court concluded that the use of the beer can opener 
was not responsive to the directions and that failure to call for a spe-
cific tool did not support the plaintiff's judgment that the glass would 
withstand the pressure applied. It is noteworthy that no mention was 
made of the requirement of adoption in the Vincent case and that 
there was no indication that this was a sale by trade name. Further-
more, the Court determined that such a method of removing a lid from 
the glass jar is not within the expectation of sellers and buyers; con-
sequently, the warranty of merchantability was not breached under a 
test of suitability for the ordinary uses for which goods of the kind and 
description are sold. It would seem that the Code would lead to this 
same sort of analysis under the ordinary purposes test of Section 2-314. 
A test of reasonable expectations of the parties also seems to be in-
vading the cases analyzing the problem of the allergic plaintiff. In 
Jacquot v. Wm. Filene's Sons CO.,7 the plaintiff, a cosmetic demon-
strator with a history of skin eruptions after the use of cosmetics, pur-
chased a fingernail kit from the defendant. The kit included instruc-
tions warning against the continued use of the product by persons with 
allergies. Over a four-month period the plaintiff used the cosmetic in 
accordance with the directions as to application and then her nails 
became cracked and inflamed with an accompanying discoloration. 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed an order of the Appellate Di-
vision, which ordered findings for the defendant after the trial court 
had found for the plaintiff. Fundamentally, the decision turned upon 
the plaintiff's failure to prove that the article was unfit to be used by a 
normal person. 
Recognizing a possible presumption of normalcy in rather cautious 
terms, the opinion concluded that such a presumption disappeared in 
t~e face of the plaintiff's history of cosmetic allergy and her derma-
tologist's testimony that the plaintiff became "abnormal to the reac-
tion," that "the average normal person does not have" such eruptions, 
and that the plaintiff "had a peculiar sensitivity to this particular 
product." The dermatologist also testified that this "unusual case" 
was the first case of dermatitis resulting from the use of the kit in his 
ten to eleven years of practice. With the case in this posture, no in-
ference of normalcy was permitted. 
The second avenue of fixing liability on the defendant in the allergy 
cases was also rejected. If the plaintiff establishes that she is one of a 
class of persons sensitive to the product, the implied warranty of fitness 
might protect her under Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay CO.8 Relying 
upon the testimony of the dermatologist that this was the first case of 
such sensitivity in his ten to eleven years of practice and the evidence 
of over 500 sales of the kit with only one such claim, the Court eval-
uated the record adversely to the plaintiff. The case rather quietly 
seems to have eliminated one of the possible evidentiary positions of 
71958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 575, 149 N.E.2d 635 (1958). 
8302 Mass. 469. 19 N.E.2d 697 (1939). 
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the plaintiff on the issue of normalcy spelled out in Payne v. R. H. 
White Co.S If Jacquot holds that the inference of normalcy is not per-
missible in the face of contrary evidence, the assumption of normalcy 
does not rise to the status of prima facie evidence and is at most a 
presumption. On the other hand, the Jacquot case should be read as 
distinguishing rather than overturning the Bianchi case. In Bianchi 
the record was rather carefully constructed to show that the face 
powder contained aniline dyes which are irritants to some persons. 
Allergy in this framework is something far different from the peculiar 
individual susceptibility of the plaintiff in Jacquot. This very dif-
ference has been suggested to be the distinction between the two sep-
arate lines of cases, one denying relief and the other granting relief.10 
When a class of buyers may be allergic to an element in the product, 
the reasonable expectation test should result in the allergy being no 
bar to liability.11 
§7.4. Impact of federal law on interests in aircraft. Periodical 
comment has recently centered heavily upon the federal statutory con-
trols over property interests in carrier's mobile equipment. 1 Under 
Section 503 of the Civil Aeronautics Act recordation of conveyances 
affecting aircraft has been lodged with the Civil Aeronautics Adminis-
tration.2 This provision obviates difficulties arising from multiple 
state recordings but requires an analysis of the rights of third parties 
in the absence of the mandatory recording of "conveyances." 3 
A somewhat involved problem of third parties' rights confronted 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Marrs v. Barbeau.4 A sold a Lock-
heed aircraft to B, who failed to record the transfer with the federal 
agency. B's creditor then caused the defendant sheriff. to attach the 
airplane. Thereafter A, induced by B's fraudulent misrepresentations, 
executed and delivered a bill of sale covering the aircraft to C Cor-
poration. C Corporation recorded and in turn sold the plane to the 
plaintiff, an innocent purchaser for value. The plaintiff also recorded. 
The plaintiff then sued the sheriff for conversion. The Court re-
s 314 Mass. 63, 49 N.E.2d 425 (1943). 
10 Horowitz, Allergy of the Plaintiff as a Defense in Actions Based upon Breach 
of Implied Warranty of Quality, 24 So. Cal. L. Rev. 221, 233-234 (1951). 
11 Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893, 898-900 (10th Cir. 1956) (concurring 
opinion), cited and quoted in part in Wright v. Carter Products Inc., 244 F.2d 53, 
58 n.3 (2d Cir. 1957). 
§7A. 1 Adkins and Billyou, Developments in Aircraft Equipment Financing, 13 
Business L. 646, 672 (1958); Scott, Liens in Aircraft: Priorities, 25 J. Air L. Be 
Comm. 193 (1958); Comment, 67 Yale L.J. 1024 (1958); Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 156 
(1958). See the new Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 726, 85th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (Aug. 23, 1958), effective sixty days after the administrator takes office. 
252 Stat. 1006 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §523 (1952). Compare the validation 
provisions for security interest in vehicles of interstate carriers. Pub. L. No. 728. 
85 Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 23. 1958), effective January I. 1959. 
3" 'Conveyance' means a bill of sale. contract of conditional sale, mortgage, as-
signment of mortgage, or other instrument affecting title to, or interest in, prop-
erty." 52 Stat. 977, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §401(18) (1952). 
4336 Mass. 416, 146 N.E.2d 353 (1957). 
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solved the problem by concluding that the attachment operated to 
reach only B's interest in the airplane and, because of the lack of re-
cording, that interest was a defeasible one as against a later bona fide 
purchaser for value. Further, even though the plaintiff's transferor, 
.C Corporation, may not have qualified as an innocent purchaser, the 
plaintiff clearly did so qualify, and his purchase defeats the attach-
ment. 
Under the theory adopted by the Court, it was not essential to con-
sider the effect of the non-recording of the attachment with the Civil 
Aeronautics Administration. However, the Court in passing rejected 
the lower court's position that the failure to record the attachment 
was fatal to the creditor's claim. This dictum rested upon an eiusdem 
generis construction of the statutory definition of conveyance which is 
not reflected in the administrative regulations dealing with recording. II 
It seems somewhat odd that, under the dictum concerning recording 
the attachment, the subsequent purchaser would be required to in-
quire into the possession of the plane and could not rely upon the 
record, while on the facts of the Marrs case the subsequent purchaser 
had no such obligation. In any event, prudent counseling calls for 
recording a notice of any such attachment until the question of federal 
law is more definitively settled.6 
§7.5. Bank deposi~s and collections. The 1957 ANNUAL SURVEY 
pointed Ol-lt that under Section 4-208 of the Code a bank taking a draft 
for collection has a "security interest" in that draft and its proceeds to 
the extent that credit has been withdrawn.1 This year the Supreme 
Judicial Court was confronted by a fact situation in which Article 4 
of the Code, if applicable, would have furnished a ready solution. In 
Shapiro v. Sioux City Dressed Beef, Inc.,2 it was held under Iowa law 
that an Iowa bank, which under the terms of a deposit slip took for 
collection a draft drawn by its depositor payable to the Iowa bank, 
held sufficient title to the draft to defeat a creditor of the drawer who 
sought by trustee process to reach the proceeds of the draft in the 
hands of a Boston bank. 
Under the Iowa law a presumption of passage of title arises when, as 
in this case, a depositor is given credit upon his account as cash and a 
right to draw against that amount. Furthermore, this presumption is 
not defeated by a deposit slip providing for a right of charge back. If 
the Code applied to this transaction,S the result here would still favor 
/; The regulations permit recording of judicial decrees and notices of tax liens. 
14 C.F.R. §50!J.2 (Supp. 1958). 
6 Compare Wilson v. Barnes, 1159 Mo. 1152, 221 S.W.2d 7111 (1949) (indicating that 
attaching creditor prevails over unrecorded purchase); Marshall v. Anderson, 169 
Kan. 5114, 220 P.2d 187 (1950) (purchaser's failure to record does not bar assertion 
of title against subsequent attaching creditor). 
§7.5. 11957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §7.4. 
21958 Mass. Adv. Sh. lOllI, 151 N.E.2d 492. Compare Universal C.I.T. Credit 
Corp. v. Guaranty Bank and Trust Co., 161 F. Supp. 790 (D. Mass. 1958). 
S Compare G.L., c. 106, §4-201. 
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the Iowa bank, since the bank would have a security interest under Sec-
tion 4-208. In the present case the security interest would cover the 
entire amount of the draft and would be perfected without any filing. 
Hence the Iowa bank would have priority over the drawer-depositor's 
creditor who seeks to reach the proceeds of the draft. 
Another aspect of the bank collection process concerned the Court 
in Krinsky v. Pilgrim Trust CO.4 The drawer delivered three checks, 
payable to a third party, to one Healey with instructions to deliver 
the checks to the payee. Healey tendered these checks to one Krinsky, 
a creditor of Healey, who insisted that the checks be certified by the 
drawee. Healey obtained the certification. Each check bore the 
words, "Pay to the order of Hyman Krinsky," followed by the payee's 
written name. Krinsky gave Healey his own check for the difference 
between the total of the three certified checks and the debt owed by 
Healey. The certified checks were deposited in the defendant bank to 
Krinsky's account with the indorsement "Credit to Hyman Krinsky, 
Trustee." Krinsky was then credited with the amount of the checks, 
which were presented to the drawee, canceled, and returned to the 
drawer. The next month the drawer claimed that the payee's indorse-
ment was forged. The drawee credited the drawer's account and re-
quested a refund from the defendant bank. The defendant complied 
and charged back the total on Krinsky's account. Krinsky sued for 
money had and received against his bank. Assaying the record on 
the issue of whether the payee's indorsement was forged, the Court 
found sufficient conflict to sustain the exceptions to the lower court's 
directed verdict in favor of the defendant bank. However, the Court 
pointed out that if the indorsement was forged, the defendant bank 
could recover any money paid from its customer either on the theory 
of unjust enrichment because of mistake or upon the warranties im-
plied under the NIL upon the transfer of the checks to the defendant 
for collection. The defense of the bank was treated as a claim in set-
off arising out of this right of recovery. 
No quarrel arises from basing the bank's claim upon notions of mis-
take. However, categorizing the defendant bank as the beneficiary of 
warranties under former G.L., c. 107, §88 is a more complex problem.1I 
First of all Section 88 imposes the warranty only upon those negotia-
ting an instrument. Since Krinsky's indorsement can be classified as 
restrictive, i.e., vesting the title in the indorsee in trust, serious doubt 
arises as to whether Krinsky negotiated the check to the defendant 
bank.6 
Under the Code it seems that the result would be unchanged, al-
though perhaps the means of reaching the decision would be less com-
plex. In Section 4-207(1) the Code establishes certain warranties in 
41958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 691, 149 N.E.2d 665. 
II NIL §66. 
6 Compare First National Bank of Minneapolis v. City National Bank of Hol-
yoke, 182 Mass. 130,65 N.E. 24 (1902), with In re Ziegenhein, 187 S.W. 893 (Mo. App. 
1916). 
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favor of payor banks and other payors. A payor bank is defined in 
Section 4-105 as "a bank by which an item is payable as drawn or 
accepted." Payor is an undefined term apparently covering those cases 
where a non-bank is to payor accept an item.7 This would not seem 
to be pertinent to the resolution of the problem of the warranty in 
favor of a collecting bank such as the defendant here. Section 4-207 (2) 
sets out the warranties in this case and includes an undertaking that 
all signatures are genuine or authorized. 
The operative word in Section 4-207(2) of the Code is transfer and 
not negotiation, so that the problem of Section 88 of G.L., c. 107 is 
avoided. Furthermore, Section 4-201 of the Code makes the question 
of the collecting bank's status as a purchaser or agent immaterial in 
applying Article 4, Bank Deposits and Collections. Finally, the Code 
would leave unaffected the defendant's right of set-off based upon such 
warranty, even though there had been final settlement or payment of 
the check.8 
In Polonsky v. Union Federal Savings and Loan Association 9 the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that a bank which had paid out funds to 
a person wrongfully in possession of the depositor's passbook was free 
from liability to its depositor because of a broad exculpatory clause 
printed on the inside of the bank book cover. The case was a harsh 
one primarily because of the broadness of the exculpatory provision 
and doubt as to the depositor's awareness of the clause.1° The General 
Court responded by reversing the result of the case in a rather broadly 
worded statute, Chapter 213 of the Acts of 1958. 
Any agreement between a depositor, certificate holder or share-
holder and any bank, credit union or savings and loan association 
doing business in this commonwealth which exculpates such bank, 
credit union or savings and loan association when a deposit or 
share account, or any part thereof, is paid by such bank, credit 
union or savings and loan association to a persoll' unlawfully pre-
senting a pass book, certificate or other evidence of such account is 
hereby declared to be contrary to public policy and void. 
It is noteworthy that the statute voids any such exculpatory agree-
ments whether or not the bank explicitly and particularly calls the pro-
vision to the attention of the depositor. Furthermore, it may possibly 
catch within its provisions negotiable instruments such as treasurer's 
checks and register checks, thus increasing the bank's liability in con-
nection with such instruments. In any event, the statute is noteworthy 
as the first enactment that alters a Code provision without specific ref-
erence to the Code. As noted in the 1957 ANNUAL SURVEY, the rule of 
7 Comment No.4 to §4-207, Ann. Laws Mass., Special Supplement, G.L., new c. 
106 (1958). 
8 General Laws, c. 106, §4-213(3) explicitly preserves the right of the bank to 
apply any credit to any obligation of its customer. See also §3-418. 
9334 Mass. 697,138 N.E.2d 115 (1956). 
1Q 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §18.3. 
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Section 4-103 on variation by agreement was probably consistent with 
the Polonsky case.ll The enactment of this special statute clearly lim-
its the effect of the Code. 
§7.6. Secured transactions: Liens arising by operation of law. In 
addition to the cases previously discussed in connection with retail 
instalment sales transactions, one other decision of the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court during the 1958 SURVEY year merits discussion in connec-
tion with lending or extending credit secured by personal property.1 
North End Auto Park, Inc. v. Petringa Trucking CO.,2 involved a 
garage keeper's lien under C.L., c. 255, §§25 and 26. During a one-
year period the garageman stored trucks, trailers and tractors, supplied 
them with gas and oil, and repaired the vehicles.s For the first nine 
months of this period, the owner used all the vehicles in its trucking 
business, taking them away daily with the garage's knowledge and con-
sent. During the following three months the vehicles remained in the 
uninterrupted possession of the garage under claim of the lien. The 
Supreme Judicial Court reversed a lower court determination that the 
interruptions in the garageman's possession during the first nine 
months caused the loss of the lien. With a careful reservation of the 
question of the rights of intervening third parties, both the statutory 
and the common law liens were held to have revived by a return of the 
property after a temporary interruption of possession.4 Practical jus-
tification for the result quite properly rests in the fact that a contrary 
determination would limit the lien to the small amount accruing after 
the vehicle's last return. 
What effect does this decision have upon other secured creditors of 
the owner of the vehicles? Under Section 9-310 of the Code, when 
goods are subject to a perfected security interest, a lien upon goods in 
the possession of a person furnishing services or materials with respect 
to such goods takes priority unless the lien is statutory and the statute 
provides otherwise. There seems to be no reason for reading "pos-
session" here as requiring something more than the "possession" called 
for by the enforcement of the lien. Consequently, on the facts pre-
sented in Petringa a prior perfected security interest in the vehicles 
will be subordinated to the garageman's lien. The priority is appar-
ently based upon the fact that the services enhance or preserve the 
collateral and thus benefit the earlier secured creditor.5 
But this provision does not solve the question of the vitality of the 
lien when the owner while in temporary possession creates a security 
11 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §5.2. 
§7.6. 1 Other chattel security cases are discussed in §9.6 infra. 
21958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 929, 150 N.E.2d 735. 
S It should be noted that the statutory lien for "storage and care" did not extend 
to the claim for gas and oil, and that the garageman's common law lien was held 
to cover the Obligation arising from the repairs. 
4 See Restatement of Security §80, Comment c. Compare the renewal of the 
seller's lien in Jones v. LeMay-Lieb Corp., 301 Mass. 133, 16 N.E.2d 634 (1938). 
5 Comment No. I to §9-310, G.L., new c. 106, Special Supplement (1958). 
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interest in an innocent third party. In such a case the Code will not 
supply a definitive rule because the question really revolves about a 
matter to be set by the lien law, i.e., the owner's power to convey the 
collateral. If the later security interest under Article 9 does not pre-
vail over the lien-holder, the lien has serious potential as a source of 
creditor deception. The ultimate solution should be in favor of the 
innocent secured creditor, since the . lien-holder has in a sense created 
a situation by which the secured party has been misled. Consequently, 
the secured party should be treated as an intervening purchaser, and 
the garageman should be precluded from asserting his lien. 
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